规模 强劲 拍卖
Scale-robust Auctions
Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Yingkai Li
arXiv
2025年10月24日
我们研究在任何规模上都很稳健的拍卖,即,它们可以应用于销售昂贵和便宜的物品,并在最坏的情况下实现最佳收入的最佳乘用近似值。 我们表明,最佳机制是规模不变,在二价卖出和第二价2.45倍数之间随机化。
We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximations of the optimal revenue in the worst case. We show that the optimal mechanism is scale invariant, which randomizes between selling at the second-price and a 2.45 multiple of the second-price.