Feedback in Dynamic Contests: Theory and Experiment
Sumit Goel, Yiqing Yan, Jeffrey Zeidel
我们研究临时反馈政策在动态全付费拍卖中的效果,其中两个玩家在两个阶段出价以赢得共同价值奖。 我们表明,顺序均衡结果的特点是最便宜的信号均衡,其中第1阶段的出价是零,而另一个玩家选择与某些信号一致的最便宜的出价。 两位玩家的均衡回报总是为零,预期总出价的总和等于奖品的价值。 我们进行了四项自然反馈政策处理的实验 - 完整,排名和两种截止政策 - 虽然投标行为偏离了平衡,但我们未能拒绝对总投标没有治疗效果的假设。 此外,第1阶段投标诱发沉没成本和头部启动,我们在第二阶段招标中测试由此产生的沉没成本和气馁效应。
We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium outcomes are characterized by Cheapest Signal Equilibria, wherein stage 1 bids are such that one player bids zero while the other chooses a cheapest bid consistent with some signal. Equilibrium payoffs for both players are always zero, and the sum of expected total bids equals the value of the prize. We conduct an exp...